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Abstract
Despite intergovernmental calls for greater policy coherence to tackle rising non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs), there has been a striking lack of coherence internationally and nationally between trade and health 
sectors. In this commentary, I explore the arguments by Lenucha and Thow in relation to barriers for greater 
coherence for NCDs, apply them to regional trade agreements, and point to next steps in research and advocacy 
for greater attention to health and NCD prevention in government trade agendas. 
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Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been an intensification 
of intergovernmental strategies, plans and Declarations 
calling for greater action to address non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs), mirroring increases in preventable deaths 
and morbidity from these diseases globally.1 From the first 
World Health Organization (WHO) Global Strategy nearly 
two decades ago, to successive WHO Global Action Plans, 
the United Nations Political Declaration on the Prevention 
and Control of Diseases, and the Sustainable Development 
Goals, NCDs have received significant global attention, albeit 
with mixed results for prioritising multisectoral action and 
coherence across policy sectors.2 
As Lenucha and Thow3 point out, much of the research 
examining this policy incoherence has focused on the 
strategies of commercial and industry actors in influencing 
policy-making to shape their interests. Documented strategies 
by firms include the promotion of advertising and marketing 
to youth, donations to political representatives, partnering 
with governments, funding biased research, co-opting health 
professionals and policy-makers, and sponsoring campaigns 
to favourably influence public opinion in their interests.4,5 
The research is telling of the economic power of industry 
actors to gain a seat at the table. At the Third United Nations 
High-Level meeting on NCDs in September 2018, for 
example, the Worldwide Brewing Alliance held an event 
promoting the role of the beer sector in advancing the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Meanwhile governments 
met to discuss action plans for targets such as 3.5 to reduce the 
harmful use of alcohol. Research on the strategies of influence 
used by industry actors and exposing their interference in 
global health and NCD policy-making is important, but as 
Lenucha and Thow3 rightly note, unless we understand why 
industry actors gain seats at the table and exert influence over 
government, we are less equipped to counter and ultimately 
shift the agenda in favour of public health and social interests 
including NCD prevention. 
Neoliberalism and Trade and Investment
Rather than seeing industry actors as exerting agency over 
policy-makers in a vacuum, Lenucha and Thow argue that 
the context matters, and in particular that ways of “thinking 
and doing” which are historically informed and embedded 
in contemporary institutions, matter. In examining barriers 
to policy coherence for NCDs, and in particular using the 
political economy of tobacco in African countries, Lenucha 
and Thow show that the neoliberal paradigm has “conditioned 
the policy environment in ways that promote the supply of 
unhealthy commodities.” This approach to examining the 
‘deep core’ of neoliberalism in public policy-making6 points 
to the importance of understanding the way that structures 
can shape agency. I agree with the authors and have argued 
elsewhere that the dominant neoliberal ideas in trade policy-
making – for continued export growth and private enterprise 
with a reduced role of the state in regulation – constrain 
attention to the wider social determinants of health that are 
shaped by trade deals.7 
We can also see these dynamics playing out in new regional 
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trade and investment agreements through which attention 
to the potential public health impacts, or coherence with 
government NCD targets, remain largely on the periphery. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, a mega regional 
trade deal initially led by the United States with eleven 
counties in the Pacific Rim, is a key example of the new 
generation of trade agreements that contain a raft of measures 
which constrain public regulatory space and enable greater 
access to health-harmful products including the NCD risk 
factors tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed foods.8 
Framing analysis of policy actors’ submissions in Australia 
has shown how industry actors use neoliberal framing to 
urge policy-makers to promote export growth and remove 
perceived regulatory “barriers” to trade underpinned by 
assumptions that the economic benefits will trickle down to 
all in society.7 These framings work because they align with 
what policy-makers in government trade departments see 
as their key objectives from decades of neoliberal reform in 
public policy, and thus policy-makers and industry actors 
share a common framing and worldview that facilitates their 
engagement. 
This worldview is particularly antithetical to public health 
objectives in the trade policy domain when arguments 
for reducing alcohol harm, tobacco use, and consumption 
of ultra-processed foods, or facilitating access to generic 
medicines for NCD treatment, come up against alcohol, food, 
tobacco or originator pharmaceutical industries in countries. 
Lenucha and Thow show, for example, that policy-makers 
in African countries have supported tobacco industries not 
because of the power of the tobacco industry as lobbying 
agents, but because of their shared ideas for the role of market 
enterprise in facilitating economic development. 
In government trade policy-making, these shared neoliberal 
ideas and assumptions often result in privileged access 
for industry actors over public health non-governmental 
organization (NGO) actors. During the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership negotiations, for example, the United States gave 
privileged and confidential access to sections of the draft text 
to more than 500 US-based corporate actors, and a small 
number of labour union and NGOs.9 In Australia, interviews 
with stakeholders reveal greater satisfaction by industry actors 
with the formal government policy processes for consultation, 
with public health NGO actors and academic experts 
lamenting a lack of meaningful engagement.10 These apparent 
power imbalances between industry and public health NGOs 
appear to be reflected inside government, where government 
Health departments appear reliant on trade officials who act 
as gatekeepers to treaty text.3
Next Steps and Future Research
The result of years of neoliberal reforms in public policy-
making worldwide is that the dominant ideas, embedded in 
policy institutions, favour engagement with industry actors 
and export promotion and trade liberalisation, creating 
problems for NCD coherence. How might this be overcome? 
The task seems daunting, and Lenucha and Thow argue that 
one approach is to focus on the oft-neglected supply side, 
and in the context of tobacco and agricultural production, 
approaches that promote healthy product environments 
through engaging with agribusiness. 
In examining trade policy, I have documented with 
colleagues how the strength of exporter interests over a 
particular product appears to shape government’s willingness 
to consider the health implications in their trade mandates.3 
Australia for example has weak tobacco exports, is strong 
on domestic tobacco control, and informants have reported 
greater attention to the potential consequences for tobacco 
control regulation in trade deals.3 In contrast, as a major 
alcohol exporter, informants have reported significant 
barriers to elevating attention to alcohol harm and alcohol 
regulatory consequences in Australia’s trade policy processes. 
The hypocrisy has been pointed out by other scholars, and 
was particularly stark when Australia was defending its 
tobacco legislation at the World Trade Organization while 
simultaneously raising trade concerns with Thailand and other 
countries over their proposed alcohol labelling regimes.11 
To tackle supply would be to encourage alcohol exporters to 
change their products to truly healthy ones, a task that would 
help reduce export pressures on governments, but which also 
seems daunting. 
Another approach, which can be pursued in tandem 
with advocating healthy product supply, is to reframe 
the economics of these health-harmful industries which 
contribute significant costs through increasing NCD 
morbidity and mortality. Further research on the causal 
links between trade and investment agreements and harmful 
products, such as those detailing increased consumption of 
sugary drinks,12 could help make the connection for public 
health oriented policy-makers. Further, developing costings 
of the economic impact of these diseases on the health system 
and on pharmaceutical expenditures, could help reframe the 
economics of trade to account for the true costs of facilitating 
health-harmful products. 
Research that explores examples of success and their lessons 
for advocacy could also enable greater understanding of how 
to elevate health above profit motives. In 2003, for example, 
Australia banned the manufacturing and importation of 
asbestos, a product used in building materials but which was 
classed as a health hazard due to links between inhaling fibres 
and cancer. Part of this story is shifting supply to other forms 
of building material. Another is strong concerted advocacy 
by an international trade union movement of workers, 
supported by health experts and associations. The role of the 
union movement, and of workers willing to transition away 
from employment in health-harmful industries, including 
coal, requires coalition building by public health advocates, 
and strong government support for just transitions and secure 
and safe work. 
Other examples outside of the NCD domain are also 
revealing of how coalitions can shift supply. Workers in 
a formerly coal dominated area in the La Trobe Valley 
of South-eastern Australia have established a successful 
worker cooperative to supply renewable energy products 
to the region.13 Could workers, industry and governments 
contribute to a supply shift in heath-harmful products? Cases 
such as these are worth exploring for identifying the framing 
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strategies and coalitions of actors, including industry allies 
where appropriate, that have formed in other sectors and 
have enabled the elevation of social and health interests above 
profit. 
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